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Public Support for State Redistribution in Western 
and Central Eastern European Countries
A Cross-National Comparative Trend Analysis
Anja Eder
Introduction:  
Increasing Inequalities and Public Support for State Redistribution
Even before the recent worldwide economic crisis, the distribution of incomes in many 
OECD countries has become more unequal during a period of economic growth and high 
employment since the 1970s and 1980s (OECD 2015). Whereas in the 1980s the top 10% of 
the population earned 7 times as much as the lowest 10%, in the early 2000s, the top 10% 
earned nearly 10 times, and today earn the “highest since records began” (OECD 2015). 
From this trend, several scholars have concluded the historical phase of equalization has 
ended (e.g., Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Grusky 2001; Nollmann 2006). Simultaneously, 
Western countries established third way policies (Giddens 1998) that make welfare ben-
efits increasingly conditional to guarantee “economic dynamism as well as social justice” 
(Powell and Barrientos 2004, 12). During this period, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) established democratic and free economies, accompanied by extensive capi-
talization and privatization (Kollmorgen 2009, 76). Today, CEE countries are among the 
countries worldwide that have the highest between-country variation in inequality (Haller 
et al. 2016); however, average economic prosperity is still lower than in Western Europe 
(Aidukaite 2011, 212). 
Against the background of these developments, this chapter focuses on the question to 
what extent people think that their governments are responsible for reducing income dif-
ferences, according to data from the ISSP Module on Social Inequality (International Social 
Survey Programme). Public support plays a decisive role in political decisions and directly 
or indirectly influences social structural changes (e.g., Burstein 2003; Brooks and Manza 
2006). In democratic societies, voters have the opportunity to choose between political 
parties that are more or less prone to redistributive policies. In addition, from a histori-
cal perspective, it is clear that people’s convictions and values have always been decisive 
regarding the strength of labor unions, leftist and conservative political parties and the 
establishment of different types of welfare states across countries (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
This chapter pays special attention to potential changes in preferences for state redistribu-
tion throughout the 1990s and 2000s and to contrasts between countries and ideal-typical 
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welfare state regimes during a period of increasing income inequality, growing global 
economic competition and East European post-socialism. 
Previous research has focused on different hypotheses to explain the variation across 
countries and time. The present chapter aims to identify the explanatory power of three 
hypotheses: (1) the regime hypothesis, (2) the hypothesis of normative accommodation, 
and (3) government protection thesis. According to the regime hypothesis, support for state 
redistribution depends on historically grown and stable dominant values within specific 
welfare state regimes. In contrast, normative accommodation includes learning processes, 
leading to a delayed change in expectations and attitudes toward state redistribution, 
whereas the government protection thesis focuses on the perceived need for state redistri-
bution depending on the actual level of prosperity and the degree of unemployment and 
social spending within countries.
Based on the regime hypothesis, countries were selected as representatives of G. Esping-
Andersen’s ideal-typical welfare-state regimes (WFS): Norway (NO) and Sweden (SE) as 
representatives of social democratic WFS, West Germany (W-DE) and Austria (AT) as con-
servative/corporatist WFS and the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), New Zea-
land (NZ) and Australia (AU) as liberal WFS. In addition, NZ, UK and AU were treated as a 
subtype of the liberal WFS, namely, as “radical WFS” (Castles and Mitchell 1993). However, 
special attention should be paid to the potential differences between Eastern and Western 
European countries across time. Therefore, the typology includes seven contrasting CEE 
countries: Russia (RU), Poland (PL), Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), 
Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SI), as well as the special case of East Germany (E-DE).1 
For these countries, varying trends of income inequality at different levels are clear (see 
Table 1). Gini coefficients indicate the strongest increase at the beginning of the 1990s in 
the CEE countries, particularly in Russia and Bulgaria, and a remarkable heterogeneity 
among the CEE countries. In the Western European countries, income gaps widened to a 
lower degree and have always been biggest in the liberal WFS and smallest in the social-
democratic WFS. Increasing inequalities are the most distinct pattern at the beginning of 
the 1990s, followed by comparably minor decreases in the late 1990s in the CEE countries. 
1 The South European welfare state type (rudimentary type per Gelissen 2002) is not included in 
the analyses because countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal did not participate in 
all three survey waves.
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Table 1 Income inequality and average changes in income inequality across countries and time
NO SE DE AT US UK NZ AU RU PL BG CZ HU SK SI
Level of income inequality (Gini coefficients)
av. 1990–1995 23 22 27 29 35 34 32 30 38 28 27 22 30 20 21
av. 1997–2001 24 23 27 26 37 34 33 31 41 29 29 25 29 25 23
av. 2007–2011 23 24 29 27 37 36 32 34 41 31 33 25 27 26 24
Changes in income inequality (percentage points)
1988–1994 -0.4 1.2 1.0  3.5 2.2  2.5 4.5 0.1 18.4  2.6  7.8  5.0  7.4  3.1  4.2
1995–2001  2.1 1.7 0.1 -1.6 0.9 -0.4 0.4 0.9 -4.3 -3.2 -1.8  1.6 -3.7  3.3 -0.7
2002–2011 -2.0 0.5 1.1  1.3 0.1  1.5 -0.7 3.4  1.5  1.7  7.7 -1.7 -0.4 -0.6  2.8
Gini coefficients of Household Incomes after Taxes and Transfers (average Gini coefficients and 
changes in the Gini coefficients in percentage points)
Source: Frederick Solt (2009): Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Version 4_1
The ISSP surveys were conducted in 1992, 1999 and 2009.
The Regime Hypothesis:  
Historically Grown Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes
One of the most prominent approaches to explain country differences in public support for 
state redistribution is the regime hypothesis, which starts from the assumption of a forma-
tive effect of a country’s historically grown welfare state institutions (Gelissen 2002). “The 
identities and interests of social actors are (…) created in a process where the institutional 
framework within which people act, and the historical traditions through which events 
and processes are interpreted, have a decisive impact” (Svallfors 1997, 291). Welfare state 
institutions directly influence people’s life chances and incorporate distributive norms and 
standards of social justice. Thus, these institutions are normative settings and constitute a 
frame for political action and social conflicts (e.g., Mau 2004). 
From this institutional-historical perspective, people’s views of state redistribution are 
stable across time, at least in western countries. Regarding country differences, there has 
been a lot of debate on the classification of Western countries; however, only little effort 
has been made concerning typologies for CEE countries. G. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is the most prominent approach to classifying dif-
ferent types of WFS in Western countries and even the work’s numerous critics conclude 
that “there is plenty of reason to continue to work on and with the original or modified 
typologies” (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 137). Therefore, Esping-Andersen’s classical typology 
of liberal, conservative and social-democratic regimes provides important theoretical argu-
ments for the ongoing analyses. To sum up, state redistribution in liberal WFS is small, and 
individualism in a free market economy, where trade unions are weak and minimum wages 
and social assistance benefits are low, is predominant. This leads to the social cost of high 
inequality and poverty for the benefit of high economic and employment growth (Esping-
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Andersen 1996, 15-18; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 15f.). Castles and Mitchell (1993) 
introduced the radical welfare state as a subtype of the liberal WFS, which is characterized 
by higher benefit equality, comparably higher taxes and stronger labor movements and 
distinguishes the UK, New Zealand and Australia from the US. However, several scholars 
described the UK as a “borderline case” (e.g., Svallfors 1997, 286) that cannot be clearly 
subsumed as a liberal or radical type of welfare state.
In conservative welfare states, de-commodification2 is high, and the state takes far-
reaching responsibility for the pension system, unemployment insurance and social assis-
tance, financed by compulsory contributions. Conservative WFS, in particular, face prob-
lems of market rigidity, the “welfare without work trap” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 17), 
early retirement that strains the pension system and insufficient integration of women in 
the labor market (2002, 16f.). In social democratic WFS, the state intervenes most exten-
sively, and social benefits are universal (Esping-Andersen 1990; see also Sejersted 2011). 
Extraordinarily strong left-wing parties and labor unions contribute to the strength of 
egalitarianism. However, this regime is costly and relies on high employment and growth 
to manage the high tax requirements (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 14).
Despite a similar past of high de-commodifaction and minimal social inequality,3 the 
CEE countries established varying social security systems during the course of the last two 
decades and today face highly differing levels of inequality (e.g., Aidukaite 2009). Esping-
Andersen (1996) early claimed that the post-socialist countries would adapt to one of the 
Western worlds of welfare capitalism. However, recent research suggests mixed patterns of 
social-democratic, conservative-corporatist and neo-liberal policies within individual CEE 
countries (Fenger 2007; Kollmorgen 2009). 
Table 2 Typologies of post-socialist welfare states based on M. Fenger’s (2007) and R. Kollmorgen’s 
(2009) work    4
Typologies Countries
Fenger (2007) 1. USSR
2. Post-communist European 
3. Developing type4
1. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic States
2. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia
3. Romania, Moldova, Georgia
Kollmorgen (2009) 1. Rudimentary-state-paternalistic
2. State-led conservative-corporatist
3. Neoliberal-social democratic
1. Russia, Ukraine
2. Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia
3. Estland, Lithuania
*  Fenger and Kollmorgen use different countries and methods in their typologies; therefore, 
comparability is limited. Nonetheless, they subsume the Baltic States to different welfare state 
types, Fenger to the USSR type and Kollmorgen to the neoliberal-social democratic type. 
2 “De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21-22).
3 They also share a phase of ad-hoc reforms after 1989, followed by a phase of privatization (more 
extensive than in the West) and in the last few years re-orientation and consolidation where 
neo-liberal policies have been balancing out (Kollmorgen 2009, 85-87).
4 The developing type is not relevant for the ongoing analysis.
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Table 2 shows two relevant welfare state typologies for the ongoing analyses: One typol-
ogy considers Fenger’s (2007) former USSR type and Kollmorgen’s (2009) rudimentary 
state-paternalistic type. In the USSR-type, government expenditures are similar to those in 
conservative WFS; however, less protection is provided, leading to a distinctly worse social 
situation. This type is called rudimentary and state-paternalistic because it is an authori-
tarian state, and family networks and the subsistence economy are important (Kollmor-
gen 2009).5 Whereas Kollmorgen attributes neoliberal programs in particular to the Baltic 
countries, several authors in the case of Russia speak of a “mix of neoliberal ideas and 
Soviet legacies and institutions” (Teplova 2007, 285). 
The post-communist European type and the state-led conservative-corporatist type face 
better economic development and are more egalitarian than previously. Kollmorgen points 
out that in particular the Visegrád states (PL, SK, CZ, HU) and Slovenia established a 
mix of neoliberal policies and state-led social policies during the course of the countries’ 
transformation (2009, 81). Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia followed 
a Bismarckian tradition and evolved towards conservative WFS (also see  Aspalter et al. 
2009, 180), whereas social protection is comparably lower in Slovakia (Aidukaite 2011, 
216). Bulgaria, in particular, adopted extensive liberal policies while facing severe reduc-
tions in public health spending, and a deterioration in the pension system, contributing to 
a high risk of poverty for elderly citizens (Sotiropoulus et al. 2003).6 A special case among 
the CEE countries is East Germany, which was integrated into the conservative regime of 
West Germany and the world economy much faster than any other post-socialist country 
(see also Riedl and Haller 2014). 
In line with the regime hypothesis, previous research has shown that people in liberal 
welfare states supported state redistribution the least in the 1990s (e.g., Dallinger 2010). 
Findings regarding social democratic and conservative welfare states, however, are not 
consistent with the classical typologies: Support for redistribution is higher in conservative 
welfare states than in social democratic welfare states (Svallfors 1997, 288; Dallinger 2010, 
340). In addition, the conservative welfare state of Germany confirmed its similarity to 
liberal welfare states in the 1990s (Dallinger 2010, 340), whereas support for redistribution 
was distinctly higher in Austria. Nonetheless, scholars argue that “welfare regimes affect 
both the mean and the variance in public support for state redistribution” (Jaeger 2009, 
734). Previous results regarding post-socialist countries confirm more support for state 
redistribution than in Western European countries (Dallinger 2010, 340; Andreß and Heien 
2001), although detailed analyses of heterogeneity are missing. Based on the classical and 
new typologies of welfare states for the CEE countries, the following hypothesis and sub-
hypotheses are formulated for the extended period throughout the 1990s and 2000s:
5 Additional characteristics are a comparably lower GDP and a high level of corruption (Ibid.).
6 Despite a low GDP, low social spending and high inequality and poverty risk, Bulgaria is included 
in this type.
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H1: Citizens of liberal welfare states least support state redistribution, followed by social 
democratic and conservative welfare states. The highest support for state redistribution 
is expected in post-socialist countries.
a) The US is expected to be less prone to state redistribution than the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand (see liberal vs. radical WFS).
b) Among the post-socialist countries, East Germany is expected to be least in favor of 
state redistribution, followed by Slovenia and the Visegrád states, whereas Bulgaria 
and Russia are expected to be the most likely to support state redistribution.
Processes of Normative Accommodation and the Subjective Need 
for State Redistribution
Whereas according to the regime hypothesis country differences in attitudes toward state 
redistribution are stable, several approaches offer different explanations for potential 
changes across time. One approach focuses on the processes of normative accommoda-
tion (e.g., Sachweh 2010, 64), meaning that people over time adapt their expectations to 
changed societal circumstances. Economic conditions might impact men’s consciousness 
(e.g., Marx and Engels 1970 [1859]: 10). Thus, if inequality rises, people tend to legitimate 
the growing gaps between the wealthy and less wealthy and vote for less state redistribu-
tion, although with a specific time lag. This effect might be more likely in countries of high 
inequality. Alternative approaches concentrate on the factual need for state redistribution 
considering a country’s affluence, level of unemployment, and public social spending. 
Under the government protection thesis, support for state redistribution is lower in coun-
tries where there is less need for government aid (Dallinger 2010; Blekesaune 2007). People 
in countries with high unemployment, for instance, perceive a higher risk of becoming 
unemployed, feel more concern for the unemployed, and are more in favor of state redis-
tribution (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, 418). 
Whereas normative accommodation includes cognitive learning processes, leading to a 
change in expectations delayed in time, the government protection thesis focuses on the 
perceived need for state redistribution, depending on the actual level of economic prosper-
ity, unemployment, and social spending. Thus, both approaches focus on different start-
ing conditions and causal mechanisms. The three approaches are not mutually exclusive 
(see Table 3): People might adapt their expectations to social structural changes; however, 
regime differences might remain. In addition, processes of normative accommodation and 
the government protection thesis are expected to hold for the highly unequal and least 
prosperous Bulgaria and Russia. 
Recent findings show a mixed picture in answer to the question of people normatively 
accommodating to changing levels of inequality. Whereas according to the hypothesis, 
scholars report growing tolerance for inequality in times of rising inequalities (Gijsberts 
2002, 281; Osberg and Smeeding 2006, 461), others confirm a distinct preference for more 
equality in Western European countries with comparably low but increasing levels of 
inequality (Hadler 2007; Kenworthy and McCall 2008). In turn, other analyses show no 
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relation between the actual level of income inequality and people’s attitudes (e.g., Dal-
linger 2010). Particularly in the 1990s, a decrease in support for state redistribution was 
expected, mainly because the principle of individualism gained importance (e.g., Taylor-
Gooby 2001). However, empirical analyses did not support this assumption; even in liberal 
welfare states, approval of state redistribution increased (e.g., Taylor-Gooby 1995). The 
most consistent result considers the increasing support for state redistribution in several 
CEE countries, where income inequality rose the most (e.g., Örkény and Székelyi 2000). 
Overall, scholars also report constant and distinctly high preferences for state redistribu-
tion as the leading pattern (e.g., Ullrich 2000). On the backdrop of those previous results, 
the relation between inequality and approval of state redistribution will be investigated 
anew for the extended period of the 1990s and 2000s.
H2: In the sense of normative accommodation, increases in income inequality are 
expected to be related to a delayed decrease in approval of state redistribution. This pat-
tern will be particularly strong in countries where the income gap widened strongly and 
the level of inequality is high, namely, in Russia, Bulgaria and in Hungary as well as in 
the US, the UK and New Zealand.
In previous research, differences between Western and Eastern European countries were 
notably ascribed to varying levels of economic prosperity, and scholars concluded that 
“in transition countries high public expectations for state action aimed at more equality 
are the result of a weak economy [rather] than of post-socialist ideology” (Dallinger 2010, 
345). From this perspective, economic growth and employment determine public support 
for state redistribution but not the level of income inequality per se (Dallinger 2010, 341). 
This explanation is far from the regime hypothesis of historically grown distributional 
norms and seems especially instructive for the analyses of the variation between the CEE 
countries. Are people in the economically more successful CEE countries, who face lower 
unemployment rates and higher social spending (Dallinger 2010), less likely to support 
state redistribution compared to people in the CEE countries worse off? The underlying 
assumption considers that subjective need for state redistribution depends on comparisons 
with the level of prosperity in other countries and to a lesser extent on the changes within 
the own country (e.g., Delhey and Kohler 2005). Since upward comparisons with more 
affluent countries are most likely (ibidem), subjective need in the less prosperous CEE-
countries is expected to be highest at all three time points. In line with the government 
protection thesis, the following hypothesis is formulated for the extended period through-
out the 1990s and 2000s:
H3: People in more prosperous countries, facing comparably lower unemployment rates 
and higher social spending are less likely to support state redistribution throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Among the CEE countries, Bulgaria and Russia show the highest sup-
port, whereas East Germany, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic show the lowest support 
for state redistribution.
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Table 3 The regime hypothesis, processes of normative accommodation, and the government 
protection thesis in comparison
Regime hypothesis Normative accommodation Government protection 
Mechanism Historically grown 
dominant values
Legitimating due to 
adaptation of expectations 
to circumstances via 
learning
Dependent on a 
country’s prosperity (and 
unemployment and social 
spending)
Changes  
across time
Stable ranking of countries 
(but adaptation of Visegrád 
countries to conservative 
regime)
->  no systematic changes 
across time (see H1)
Delayed cognitive 
adaptation to changes in 
circumstances  
->  negative association 
between changes of 
inequality and public 
support for state redis-
tribution (see H2)
Immediate reflection of 
actual level  
 
->  higher levels of pros-
perity go hand in hand 
with less need for state 
redistribution (see H3)
Countries Rank order West (from least 
to most support):
Liberal (US, UK, NZ, AU) 
Conservative (AT, W-DE) 
Social-democratic (SE, NO)
 
Rank order CEE (from least 
to most support):
East-Germany 
Visegrád countries and 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Russia 
Delayed accommodation 
(by the end of the 1990s)  
in countries with the 
highest increase and a 
high level of inequality, 
expected in: 
RU, BG, HU
Delayed accommodation 
(by the end of the 1990s) 
in countries with a mean 
increase but a high level  
of inequality, expected in:  
US, NZ, UK
More need in CEE than 
in Western European 
countries
  
 
 
 
Most need in BG and RU, 
lowest need among CEE 
countries in SI, CZ, E-DE
Data, Variables, and Methods
The following analyses are based on data from the ISSP module on Social Inequality (1992, 
1999 and 2009). Countries were selected as ideal-typical representatives of social demo-
cratic, conservative and liberal welfare regimes and included seven CEE countries (see the 
Introduction). The total dataset included 57,807 respondents. 
The main dependent variable considers the following item: 
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
Respondents rated their approval on a five-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 
= neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree). 
The scale was recoded so that higher values mean a higher preference for state redistribu-
tion. 
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The following items were also considered: 
Income differences in (country) are too large,
The government should provide a decent living standard for the unemployed, and 
The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
Answers again were on a five-point scale. 
Four macro-indicators were included in the analysis: (1.) The Gini coefficient of income 
distribution gives a general indication of the amount of income inequality within coun-
tries and varies (in principle) between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. The Gini 
data stem from Frederick Solt’s (2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID). To look at processes of normative accommodation, changes in income inequality 
were taken into account and controlled for the level of income inequality. (2.) A country’s 
economic prosperity was measured with the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
current U.S. dollars provided by the World Bank. In relation to the government protection 
thesis, (3.) unemployment rates from the World Bank7 and (4.) the degree of public social 
protection expenditure as a percentage of the GDP per capita (including public social pro-
tection and health expenditure; see International Labour Organization 2014) were included. 
The same macro-indicators were used for West and East Germany.
This chapter provides a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the cross-country varia-
tion and temporal changes in attitudes toward state redistribution. Variance analyses and 
post-hoc tests (Games Howell, Dunett’s T3, Tanhame’s T2) were conducted to test differ-
ences across countries’ welfare regimes. Table 4 and Figure 2 illustrate the relation between 
support for state redistribution and the selected macro-indicators across time.
Public Support for State Redistribution Across Different Welfare 
State Regimes Throughout the 1990s and 2000s:  
The Regime Hypothesis
In the first step, people’s views of the government’s responsibility to reduce income dif-
ferences across WFS regimes are examined. Figure 1 indicates three worlds of welfare 
state attitudes: Western European, Eastern European, and liberal views outside Europe. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, support for state redistribution is lowest in the liberal 
WFS (mean=3.2; SD=1.2) and highest in the CEE countries (mean=4.1; SD=1.1). Inconsis-
tent with Esping-Andersen’s regime typology but corresponding to earlier findings for the 
1990s (Svallfors 1997; Dallinger 2010), Sweden and Norway do not form a specific social-
democratic regime and Austria and West Germany do not belong to a unique conserva-
tive world of welfare attitudes (mean=3.7; SD=1.1/3.5; SD=1.1). Further, challenging the 
regime hypothesis, the UK does not fit into the liberal pattern, and only the Czech Republic 
deviates from the other post-socialist countries.
7 Unemployment rates correspond to the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition of “the 
share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.”
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In the 1990s and 2000s, the UK shows distinctly higher preferences for state redistribu-
tion (mean=3.7, SD=1.1) compared to the US (mean=2.8, SD=1.2), NZ (mean=3.2, SD=1.2) 
and AU (mean=3.2, SD=1.2) and thus fits into the European social democratic and con-
servative WFS regime. The British deviation from the liberal pattern might be interpreted 
from the country’s positioning in the European cultural area, that is, by the historical tra-
dition and the deep impact of the British Labor Party. Nonetheless, the British Labor Party 
is considered less egalitarian than social democratic parties in other European countries 
(Heffernan 2000), and the country looks back to an era of extensive liberal policies dur-
ing Thatcherism (e.g., Hall and Jacques 1983). Therefore, the British welfare state has been 
characterized as collectivistic and individualistic (Ginsburg 1992, 104). This double charac-
ter is mirrored in other British views of social inequality. On the one hand, high support for 
state redistribution and the critique of income inequality indicate egalitarian views.8 The 
comparably low approval of the state to support the unemployed and poor demonstrates 
the dominance of the principle of individualism9 on the other hand (for a comprehensive 
comparison, see Edlund and Svallfors 2011).
In accordance with previous findings, support for state redistribution in Scandinavia 
is distinctly lower than one might expect based on the high level of state intervention, 
supporting the notion of “saturation” for the extended period throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Particularly in Norway, the average support for state redistribution decreases dur-
ing the course of the 2000s, whereas in Sweden approval of state redistribution increases 
slightly throughout the 1990s. However, Sweden and Norway are likely to support state 
assistance for the unemployed and the poor10; thus, the saturation thesis is limited to a 
rejection of further state redistribution and does not consider a general refusal of state 
intervention. Within the ideal types of the conservative and social democratic WFS, Aus-
tria with the highest approval of state redistribution at all three time points (mean=3.8; 
SD=1.1) is positioned in-between the Western and Eastern European countries. This find-
ing corresponds to previous research for the 1990s and goes back to the deep impact of the 
Social Democratic Party in Austria, which covers a comparably broader left-wing political 
spectrum compared to Germany (e.g., Haller et al. 2015). Despite these peculiarities, simi-
larities between the neighbors Austria and West Germany are obvious in people’s high 
dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of incomes and high approval for the state to 
support the unemployed and the poor.11
8 Income differences are too large (1 to 5): Mean 1992=1.9; Mean 1999=1.9; Mean 2009=2.0
9 Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean 2009=2.9/ Spend less on the poor (1 to 5): Mean 
2009=3.5
10 Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean in SE 2009=2.0; Mean in NO 2009=2.1  
Spend less on the poor (1 to 5): Mean in SE 2009=3.9; Mean in NO 2009=4.0
11 Income differences are too large (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 1992=1.9; W-DE 1999=2.1; W-DE 2009=1.7 
Mean in AT 1992=1.9; W-DE 1999=1.8; W-DE 2009=1.7  
Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 2009=2.5; Mean in AT 2009=2.6 
Spend less on the the poor (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 2009=3.9; Mean in AT 2009=3.9
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Source: ISSP Module on Social Inequality 1992, 1999, 2009
Figure 1 “It is the responsibility of the state to reduce income differences” throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s (Means, 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)
The Czech Republic is positioned in-between the West and East European countries 
(mean=3.8; SD=1.2), with the exception of the late 1990s when the Czech Republic approx-
imated the other CEE countries. Including the Czech Republic, the variation among the CEE 
countries is similar to the variation among the liberal type. Taking into account further 
attitudes, it is clear that the Czech Republic is also comparably less critical of the prevailing 
income gaps by the beginning of the 1990s,12 and with Slovakia and East Germany, less 
12 Income differences are too  large (1 to 5): Mean in 1992=2.1
92 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Anja Eder | Public Support for State Redistribution in Western and Central Eastern European Countries 
often wants the government to provide a decent living for the unemployed.13 In contrast, 
Bulgaria shows the highest support for state redistribution, which, by the end of the 1990s, 
includes Russia. However, as Slovakia and Hungary share similar egalitarian views, the 
Visegrád countries do not form a specific group of welfare state attitudes. Moreover, East 
Germany still seems to fit the pattern of CEE countries, although East Germany’s support 
for state redistribution decreased during the course of the 1990s.
Taking into account these results, the ranking in Hypothesis 1 is partly confirmed. 
Overall, findings from post-hoc tests (Games Howell, Dunett’s T3, Tanhame’s T2) show 
significant differences (p<0.01) of people’s attitudes towards state redistribution across 
liberal, conservative, social-democratic and post-socialist welfare states. In accordance 
with the expected ranking, the post-socialist countries, on average, show the highest and 
the liberal welfare states the lowest support for state redistribution. However, contradicting 
hypothesis 1, citizens of social democratic welfare states are less prone to redistribution 
than people of conservative welfare states (with the exception of the late 1990s). Even 
more, by the 2000s the social democratic welfare states, on average, do not differ from 
radical welfare states. According to the expectation in Hypothesis 1a, the US is the least 
likely to support state redistribution throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Hence, the radical 
welfare states (AU, NZ, UK) significantly differ from the liberal US. Since the end of the 
1990s, the rudimentary state-paternalistic welfare states (BG, RU) have shown significant 
higher support for state redistribution than the state-led conservative-corporatist type (HU, 
PL, SI, SK, E-DE, CZ). However, in contrast to the expected between-country variation 
(Hypothesis 1b), the Czech Republic, and not East Germany and Slovenia, show the least 
support for state redistribution.
Public Support for State Redistribution and its Relation to 
Inequality and Economic Prosperity:  
Normative Accommodation and Government Protection
According to the regime hypothesis, public support for state redistribution is stable in 
Western democracies, whereas the CEE countries should adapt to one world of welfare 
capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1996). However, Figure 1 already indicated the remaining 
differences between Western and the CEE countries and an overall increase in the varia-
tion across all 15 selected countries during the course of the 1990s and 2000s (the range of 
means in 1992 is from 3 to 4.3 and in 2009 from 2.7 to 4.4). Approval of state redistribu-
tion significantly increased in Russia and to a lower degree in Sweden and Poland in the 
course of the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, approval also increased in Hungary 
and Slovenia. The opposite trend can be observed in the US, the UK, New Zealand and 
Norway. In Germany, approval of state redistribution decreased in the 1990s and again 
increased in the 2000s. A reverse-U trend occurred in the Czech Republic. 
These results illustrate the complex patterns of temporal changes and continuities. Do 
the processes of a normative accommodation and/or the government protection thesis 
13 mean=between 2.2 and 2.4 in comparison to 1.8 to 1.9 in the other CEE countries
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help understand them? Based on the government protection thesis, Table 4 indicates that 
the level of economic prosperity explains cross-country variation in the support for state 
redistribution, particularly by the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s. Lower affluence goes 
hand in hand with higher approval of state redistribution. Nonetheless, the effect of the 
level of unemployment diminishes, if a country’s level of economic prosperity is controlled 
for and there is no evidence that the amount of social spending is associated with people’s 
views of state redistribution (see Hypothesis 3). In contrast, the level of income inequality 
has no verifiable impact; however, its changes across time matter. Increases of inequality 
are associated with a more distinct public support for state redistribution. The negative 
correlation by the end of the 1990s is an effect of the country sample composition; it can 
be explained by the slight decreases in income inequality in the CEE countries. 
Looking at the cross-country trends in more detail, a delayed decrease in public support 
for state redistribution during the course of the 2000s solely took place in the most unequal 
Western countries: the US and the UK (see Figure 2). However, Australia in particular devi-
ates from this pattern by increasing support for state redistribution. Thus, processes of 
normative accommodation describe the trends in the US and UK and not, as expected in 
Hypothesis 2, the trends in countries with the highest increase and a high level of inequal-
ity (Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary). Overall, there is no evidence that growing income gaps 
are related to a delayed decrease in approval of state redistribution. The overall dominant 
pattern considers rather stable and minor but significant increasing public support for state 
redistribution across time (F(2, 55143)=79.974, p<0.000; mean 1992=3.6, mean 1999=3.8, 
mean 2009=3.7). 
Table 4 Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between support for state redistribution and selected 
macro-indicators across 15 countries
Income 
inequality
Change in 
inequality
Economic 
prosperity
Unemploy-
ment
Social 
spending
‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09
Support for state 
redistribution -.09** -.03** -.03** .19** -.21** .14** -.15**-.32**-.31** .07** .22** .14** .03** -.03** -.03**
Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s -.04** .01 -.24** 0.12** -0.01
Partial correlations
change in income inequality 
controlled for level of 
inequality
controlled for 
unemployment
controlled for 
GDP per capita
controlled for 
GDP per capita
.17** -.27** .16** -.07** -.20**-.27** .05** .01 -.08** .16** .09** .09**
Statistical Significance: ** p ≤ .001, * p ≤ .01
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Expanding the government protection thesis, it was further expected that the level of 
economic prosperity, unemployment, and the amount of social spending explain the dif-
ferences across the CEE countries (see Hypothesis 3). As shown earlier, support for state 
redistribution is significantly highest in Bulgaria and Russia since the end of the 1990s. 
However, approval of state redistribution is also high and increased in the wealthiest CEE 
countries of Slovenia and the Czech Republic and the less wealthy countries of Russia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia (in Bulgaria, approval remained stable at a high level). In addi-
tion, the levels of social spending and unemployment and their developments across time 
do not explain the variation across CEE countries and within-country trends in the sense 
of the government protection thesis (see Figure 2). On these grounds, the conclusion that 
especially “in transition countries high public expectations for state action aimed at more 
equality are the result of a weak economy [rather] than of post-socialist ideology” (Dal-
linger 2010, 345) seems to fall short from a time-comparative perspective. The level of eco-
nomic prosperity explains country differences between the CEE countries and the Western 
European and Anglo-Saxon countries outside Europe but not the heterogeneity across the 
CEE countries. Overall, Figure 2 illustrates trends of rising prosperity going hand in hand 
with both decreasing and increasing support for state redistribution.
Summary and Conclusion
Against the background of varying trends of increasing income inequalities in 15 West-
ern and CEE countries (on different levels), this chapter raised the question of potential 
changes in people’s public support for state redistribution in the course of the 1990s and 
2000s. The paper aimed to identify the explanatory power of three hypotheses: (1) the 
regime hypothesis, (2) the hypothesis of normative accommodation, and (3) the govern-
ment protection thesis.
Analyses of data from the Social Inequality Module of the ISSP show that public support 
for state redistribution differs between Western and CEE countries. The preference for state 
redistribution is lowest in liberal welfare states outside Europe and remains highest in CEE 
countries. In accordance with previous research, these findings support the assumption 
that the level of economic prosperity explains country differences between East European 
and Western countries. However, restricting the government protection thesis, economic 
prosperity does not explain the between-country differences in the CEE countries, and 
rising economic prosperity in the 1990s and 2000s does not go along with a decrease in 
public support for state redistribution. In addition, previous research has shown that status 
dependency regarding the preference for state redistribution – people in a lower social 
position are more prone to support redistributive policies than people in a higher social 
position – is also a characteristic of Western societies (e.g., Örkenyi and Székelyi 2000). 
These results leave doubts that rising economic prosperity in CEE countries in the future 
will lead to less need for government aid in people’s views. Simultaneously, evidence of 
delayed processes of normative accommodation concerns only liberal countries where 
income inequality is comparatively high and increased in the course of the 1990s and 
2000s.
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Thus, a combination of the government protection thesis and the regime hypothesis 
seems appropriate to explain the fundamental differences between Western and Eastern 
European societies. The overall temporal pattern shows rather stable and minor increasing 
support for state redistribution in the course of the 1990s and 2000s. These findings sup-
port the thesis of historically grown dominant values. Nevertheless, the regime hypothesis 
tells only part of the story. Contrary to the classical regime typology of Esping-Andersen 
(1990), citizens of social democratic welfare states are less prone to redistribution than 
people in conservative welfare states. According to the extended typology of Castles and 
Mitchell (1993), the radical welfare states (AU, NZ, UK) show significantly higher support 
for state redistribution than the liberal US. Findings regarding the CEE countries support 
the typologies of state-led conservative and rudimentary state-paternalistic types (Fenger 
2007; Kollmorgen 2009): since the end of the 1990s and early 2000s the approval of 
state redistribution is significantly higher in the latter. Thus, the two typologies might be 
instructive for future research. 
Despite these inconsistencies, the analysis of deviations from the three ideal-typical 
theoretical approaches is fruitful for investigating public support for state redistribution 
from a country- and time-comparative perspective. Within this framework, future research 
should concentrate on the question of the CEE countries’ potential adaption to liberal, con-
servative, and social democratic orientations and analyze differences between age cohorts 
and changes in distributive norms and values. In addition, for the Western European con-
text, this paper poses important questions for future research: Regarding the claimed end 
of the former universal social democratic welfare state, the question arises what the notion 
of “saturation” in individual Scandinavian countries really implies and if the attitudinal 
differences between Norway and Sweden will continue. In the liberal pattern, the bor-
derline case of Great Britain and deviating increasing support for state redistribution in 
Australia are of specific concern. Are Great Britain and Australia going to form a group 
of individualistic-collectivistic orientations distinctly different from the US and New Zea-
land? 
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